We contribute to the literature on tax multipliers by analyzing the pitfalls in identi…-cation and measurement of tax shocks. Our main focus is on disentangling the discussion regarding the identi…cation of exogenous tax policy shocks (i.e., changes in tax policy that are not the result of policymakers responding to output ‡uctuations) from the discussion related to the measurement of tax policy (i.e., …nding a tax policy variable under the direct control of the policymaker).
Introduction
In the aftermath of the global …nancial crisis and ensuing recession triggered by the fall of Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008 , many governments across the world implemented aggressive countercyclical …scal policies. These stimulus packages were aimed at increasing aggregate demand and hence counteracting the recessionary environment. More recently, large …scal de…cits and concerns about debt sustainability in industrial countries, particularly in Europe and the United States, have shifted the tone of the discussion from stimulus to …scal adjustment. Since then -and following the seminal paper of Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) -there has also been a revival of studies analyzing whether …scal adjustments might be neutral, or even expansionary, especially when driven by spending cuts. 1 As a result of the policy interest …rst in …scal stimulus and later in …scal consolidation, there has been an explosion in both the theoretical and empirical literature on …scal multipliers, both on the spending and the taxation side. The theoretical literature has delivered a wide range of …scal multipliers depending upon preferences, technology, productivity of government spending, degree of tax distortion, price stickiness, underutilization of resources (i.e., the current state of the economy), the extent to which the monetary policy "leans against the wind," and debt sustainability concerns. 2 Depending on the nature of the experiment at hand, the multiplier can be as low as -2.5 (i.e., contractionary) or as expansionary as 4.
On the other hand, the empirical literature has estimated government spending multipliers that range from -2.3 (in highly indebted countries in Ilzetzki, Mendoza, and Vegh, 2010) to 3.6 (during recessions in Auerbach and Gorodnichenko, 2011) . 3 The evidence on tax multipliers -de…ned as the response of output to an increase in taxes-also shows wide variation, ranging The empirical literature has faced some major methodological obstacles, mainly related to potential endogeneity problems that may critically a¤ect the reliability of existing estimates.
The most important disagreement in the empirical literature lies on the identi…cation of …scal shocks (i.e., changes in …scal policy variables that are not directly or indirectly related to output changes). Endogeneity problems arise mainly because of two reasons. First, changes in some …scal variables, particularly tax revenues, are heavily in ‡uenced by output ‡uctuations.
Indeed, tax revenues constitute a policy outcome (as opposed to a policy instrument) that endogenously responds to the business cycle, increasing during booms and falling in recessions as the tax base (be it income or consumption) positively moves with output. The source of this endogeneity is thus related to the di¢ culty of correctly identifying the change in discretionary tax policy or policy instrument (such as tax rates), as opposed to a policy outcome (such as tax revenues).
A second source of endogeneity arises because policymakers often adjust …scal policy in response to output ‡uctuations. In fact -and based on Keynesian considerations -policymakers should engage in expansionary …scal policy precisely when output is low. Therefore, when measuring the e¤ect of …scal policy changes on economic activity, the researcher must control for the possibility that such changes are taking place as a response to output ‡uctuations.
What methodologies have been used in the empirical literature to overcome these endogeneity problems? Two main approaches have been pursued when it comes to estimating …scal multipliers. Following Blanchard and Perotti (2002) , the …rst approach is based on the structural vector autoregression (SVAR) method in combination with quarterly data (Per- Gordon and Krenn, 2010; Ilzetzki, Mendoza, and Vegh, 2010; Ilzetzki, 2011) . These authors identify …scal shocks using information about …scal institutions. On the expenditure side, their identifying assumption relies on the dynamics between …scal policy and output. In particular, they assume that government spending requires at least one quarter to respond to news about the state of the economy. On the taxation side, they use the output elasticity of tax revenues in order to di¤erentiate "discretionary" changes in taxation (also referred to as changes in cyclically-adjusted revenues) from those driven by ‡uctuations in economic activity. Under these assumptions, these authors argue that the use of quarterly data solves the endogeneity problems mentioned above. A key advantage of the SVAR is its ease of implementation and data availability. Indeed, many of these studies analyze the size of the multiplier not only in the United States and other industrial economies, but also in developing countries. This strategy has been criticized on the basis that most changes in government spending and taxes are actually forward-looking/anticipated by agents, which is at the root of the structural identi…cation (Hansen and Sargent, 1991; Ramey and Shapiro, 1998; Leeper, Walker, and Yang, 2008; Ramey, 2011).
The second methodology used to overcome identi…cation problems is related to the "natural experiment"approach. Since Barro (1981) , this approach has been used to identify …scal policy changes not triggered by ‡uctuations in current economic conditions. On the spending side, studies have typically focused on particular spending categories, such as military buildups, the least likely to respond to output ‡uctuations (Barro, 1981; Ramey and Shapiro, 1998; Hall, 2009; Fisher and Peters, 2010; Ramey, 2011; Barro and Redlick, 2011) . 5 The evidence of the "natural experiment"approach on the taxation side is scarce. Romer and Romer (2010), hereafter RR, use the narrative record, such as presidential speeches and congressional reports, to identify, on an individual basis, the nature of legislated United States federal tax changes spanning from 1945 to 2007. These authors identify exogenous (to the business cycle) tax changes; either because they are passed for long-run growth reasons or involve increases seeking to reduce an inherited budget de…cit. Regarding long-run growth tax changes, they argue that: "[t]he quintessential exogenous change might be a tax cut motivated by a belief that lower marginal tax rates will raise output in the long run. Such an action is fundamentally di¤erent from the countercyclical actions [...] because the goal is to raise normal growth, not to o¤set shocks acting to reduce growth relative to normal." Regarding de…cit-driven tax changes, they argue that "[a]n inherited de…cit re ‡ects past economic conditions and budgetary decisions, not current conditions or spending changes. If policymakers raise taxes to reduce such a de…cit, this is not a change motivated by a desire to return growth to normal or to prevent abnormal growth. So it is exogenous. An example of such a de…cit 5 This strategy has two drawbacks. From an identi…cation point of view, it is possible that military buildups have other e¤ects on the economy (e.g., via patriotism, price controls, and rationing) apart from the e¤ects on government spending (Ramey, 2011) . Moreover, most of the evidence derives from the United States experiences during World War II and the Korean War. Large wars have been relatively infrequent after 1955 in the United States, whereas military spending is fairly small outside the United States, limiting the extent to which this methodology can be applied in other countries of the world. Furthermore, in the few cases in which military spending is important, the fact that wars are often waged on domestic soil makes it impossible to distinguish the e¤ects of the war itself from the e¤ects of military spending. driven tax change is the Clinton tax increase in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993. Policymakers raised taxes not because they felt the economy was overheated and needed to be restrained, but because they felt it was prudent …scal policy and might increase long-run growth." Their main tax change measure is the planned change in tax receipts, assessed during the prior legislative process. They …nd that long-run growth tax changes have important e¤ects on output; a one unit revenue increase shock decreases output up to $3. In contrast, de…cit-driven tax hikes have a weak positive e¤ect on GDP. While RR caution about the estimates'precision, they suggest that this di¤erence across exogenous motivations might re ‡ect that augmenting taxes to reduce an inherited de…cit may be less costly than other tax increases. In a similar vein, Barro and Redlick (2011) , hereafter BR, use United States average annual marginal income tax rates from individual federal and state income taxes as well as social security payroll taxes for the period 1913-2006 and …nd a sizable negative e¤ect of tax rate increases on economic activity: a one unit revenue increase shock reduces output by $1.1.
Our paper contributes to the literature on tax multipliers. As Table 1 summarizes, our analysis disentangles the controversy regarding the identi…cation of exogenous …scal policy shocks (i.e., …scal policy changes that are not the result of policymakers responding to output ‡uctuations) from problems related to the measurement of tax policy (i.e., …nding a tax policy variable under the direct control of the policymaker). We believe that these two issues, though related, are distinct and should be addressed accordingly.
To address the issue of identi…cation, we revisit the merits of the SVAR versus the "natural experiment" approach. For the latter strategy we use -as in Favero, Giavazzi, and Perego reduce the budget de…cit and put public …nances on a more sustainable footing."As in RR, the action-based approach identi…es -through the narrative record -policy actions motivated by de…cit reduction. "If policymakers are not motivated by the state of the economy, the resulting actions should not be systematically correlated with prospective economic conditions. As a result, they are legitimate actions to use to estimate the output e¤ects of tax changes" (RR, page 770). Moreover, because accidental correlations are always a possibility, we include a number of checks and controls. In particular, as in RR, we evaluate to what extent ‡uctuations in economic activity are good predictors of (i.e., Granger cause) changes in taxes.
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To address the (much less explored) issue of measurement of tax policy, we build a novel tax rate dataset and the corresponding cyclically-adjusted revenue measure and compare the implications in terms of the size of the tax multiplier. As discussed in Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Vegh (2004) and Vegh and Vuletin (2012) , policymakers do control and legislate on tax rates. In contrast, tax revenues are a policy outcome not under the policymaker's direct control. To …x ideas, de…ne tax revenues (R) as follows:
The policymaker controls T AX RAT E but not T AX BASE and, consequently, does not control R. 6 Alternatively, we can rewrite (1) as: r t r t 1 = (tax rate t tax rate t 1 ) + (tax base t tax base t 1 ) ;
where r, tax rate, and tax base are the log of tax revenues (R), tax rate (T AX RAT E), and tax base (T AX BASE), respectively. Equation (2) indicates that the tax revenues percentage change ( r t r t r t 1 ) can be decomposed into the sum of the percentage change in the tax rate ( tax rate t tax rate t tax rate t 1 ) and the percentage change in the tax base ( tax base t tax base t tax base t 1 ).
The standard macroeconomic measure of discretionary policy tax change is the change in cyclically-adjusted t = r t r t 1 (y t y t 1 ) ;
where y is the log of output (Y ) and the historical average tax revenue elasticity of output. The …rst two terms on the right-hand side of (3) capture the percentage change in tax revenues. The third term aims at capturing the percentage change in tax revenues associated with GDP-driven changes in the tax base. This approach thus uses the percentage change in GDP together with the tax revenue-GDP elasticity. In principle, this cyclically-adjusted measure o¤ers an intuitive way of dealing with the fact that part of tax revenues, in particular the tax base, moves endogenously with the business cycle. The idea is, of course, that once tax revenues are cyclically-adjusted, changes in the …scal variable will re ‡ect the discretionary action of policymakers. Indeed, assuming that tax base t = y t it follows that cyclically-adjusted t = tax rate t . 7;8 In other words, cyclically-adjusted revenue changes seem to capture discretionary changes in tax policy; i.e. changes in tax rates.
While appealing at …rst, revenue-based measures of tax policy, such as those cyclicallyadjusted, su¤er from important measurement errors. Mirroring the discussion in the growth literature about the Solow residual, the cyclically-adjusted measure implicitly attributes any change in revenues not associated with the estimated change in the tax base to policymakers' behavior. This source of measurement error would include technical/calibration issues regarding, for example, the stability of over time (or equivalently, the stability of the ratio tax base to GDP). Moreover, there are further conceptual issues related to the in ‡uence of non-policy factors including, among others, changes in willingness/possibility to evade taxes, agents'behavior (either structural breaks or over the cycle), and ability to bribe. Thus, to the extent that measurement errors are not random in nature but depend on output ‡uctuations, these problems will introduce measurement biases.
In sum, there is really no good substitute for obtaining data on tax rates themselves when it comes to measuring changes in the tax policy instrument. In order to asses the relevance of 7 Assuming that tax baset = yt implies that is the tax base-GDP elasticity. 8 What follows is the proof of this result. Replacing (2) in (3) we obtain cyclically-adjustedt = tax ratet + tax baset yt. From tax baset = yt, it is straightforward that tax baset = yt.
Considering the latter result and cyclically-adjustedt = tax ratet + tax baset yt, we obtain cyclically-adjustedt = tax ratet. Our main results can be summarized as follows:
1. "Natural experiment" vs. SVAR: Our …ndings favors RR's in that the "natural experiment" approach seems to be a more convincing strategy to truly identify exogenous …scal shocks. 9 As in RR, we show that when using SVAR as our identi…cation strategy, alternative tax series respond promptly and signi…cantly to output ‡uctuations. These results support previous critiques about the SVAR identi…cation strategy, suggesting that the alleged unanticipated (at a one quarter horizon) changes in …scal policy are actually forward-looking/anticipated by agents. In contrast, when focusing on …scal consolidation episodes, alternative tax series barely move following movements in output. These …ndings validate the "natural experiment" approach since tax changes do not seem to be driven by policymakers'short-run reactions to GDP ‡uctuations.
2. Cyclically-adjusted revenues vs. tax rate: Our …ndings strongly support the use of changes in tax rates as a true measure of tax policy instrument. The correlation between cyclically-adjusted revenue and tax rate changes is very low, namely 0.05. The alleged discretionary tax policy proxy is a poor approximation to changes in tax policy. Indeed, while the data comprises 49 changes in tax rates, the cyclically-adjusted revenue measure identi…es 900 changes. This measure thus over-counts discretionary changes in tax policy by a factor of 17. Even when focusing on observations where tax rate changes are not zero, the correlation between changes in cyclically-adjusted revenues and tax rates is rather low, 0.26, and we cannot reject the null hypothesis of independence at a 23 percent level of con…dence. If we further restrict our comparison to …scal consolidation episodes such correlation is 0.09, and we cannot reject the null hypothesis of independence at a 77 percent level of con…dence.
Not surprisingly, these measurement issues have important implications for tax multipliers. Our main point -the importance of using tax rates to measure tax policy instrument -is, however, independent of the particular identi…cation strategy: it applies identically to the analysis of …scal shocks identi…ed through the narratives à la RR as well as when using SVAR. Tax rate increases are always contractionary. However, tax multipliers based on cyclically-adjusted revenues are, at worst, neutral or even expansionary! 3. Most up-to-date tax studies (Perotti, 2004 ; Favero and Giavazzi, 2010; Caldara, 2011;
Ilzetzki, 2011) rely on SVAR and cyclically-adjusted revenue changes (bottom-right cell in Table 1 ). In line with most of these papers, when using this strategy, we …nd that tax multipliers are not contractionary. Indeed, we …nd that a one unit revenue increase shock increases output by $0.18 on impact and $0.78 after three quarters.
When focusing on …scal consolidation episodes and cyclically-adjusted revenue changes (top-right cell in Table 1 ), tax multipliers are neutral. When using SVAR and changes in tax rates (bottom-left cell in Table 1 ), tax multipliers are contractionary. A one unit revenue increase shock reduces output by $0.37 on impact and $1.32 after three quarters. Regarding …scal consolidation episodes and changes in tax rates (top-left cell in Table 1 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses how to measure tax policy and brie ‡y elaborates on some of the practical pros and cons of focusing on the valueadded tax. Section 3 presents the tax dataset and analyzes the di¤erences between the tax rate and the cyclically-adjusted revenue series. Section 4 computes tax multipliers using …scal consolidation episodes (to identify exogenous …scal shocks) and tax rates (to measure the tax policy). Using alternative econometric speci…cations and several control variables, we …nd robust evidence on the contractionary e¤ects of value-added tax rate increases. We also show, not surprisingly, that changes in private consumption seem to drive GDP ‡uctuations. Section 5 examines the implications of alternative empirical strategies regarding the identi…cation of …scal shocks and measurement of tax policy. Section 6 provides complementary evidence on the importance of appropriately measuring the tax policy using BR and RR data for the United States. Final thoughts are presented in Section 7.
Measuring tax policy
When analyzing the business cycle properties of spending policy, most papers use government spending or government consumption. These …scal variables represent the overall policy instrument on the spending side. In contrast, tax policy does not rely on a single tax rate associated with a single activity. Governments typically resort to many di¤erent taxes, including, among others, individual and corporate income, social security contributions, property, goods and services as well as taxes on trade and …nancial transactions. Many of these taxes, especially personal income taxes, have several brackets and an intricate system of deductions.
These features complicate the extent to which researchers can unequivocally assess the stance and changes in tax policy. Up to now, most papers relying on tax rates have studied the the intricacies of the taxation system, none will ever be. That said, the profession seems to be moving in the right direction by devoting signi…cant e¤orts to gather new datasets, allowing both researchers'and policymakers'better understanding of tax instruments (such as tax rates) behavior and e¤ect, as opposed to tax outcomes (such as cyclically-adjusted revenues).
The main practical advantage of the VAT rate is that it consists of a single standard rate. 10 On the contrary, personal income taxes have several rates for di¤erent income brackets and an intricate system of deductions. The single rate allows the researcher to clearly assess the stance of tax policy. As discussed in great detail in BR, changes in the average marginal individual tax rates (AMITR) may be triggered by shifts in the underlying distribution of marginal tax rates in a manner correlated with di¤erences in labor-supply elasticities (e.g., the 1948 U.S. tax cut). Moreover, increases in the AMITR, such as the one observed in the U.S. from 1971 to 1978, may re ‡ect the shift of households into higher brackets due to high in ‡ation in the context of an unindexed tax system. This concern seems to be particularly relevant in the case of the developing world as well as industrial countries with a long history of moderate/high and persistent levels of in ‡ation, such as Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain.
A second identi…cation advantage of the VAT relates to the lag between the change in tax legislation and the household learning about it. As pointed out by BR, information regarding changes in tax rates, tax brackets, and deductions in the AMITR are arguably gradually learned by households throughout the year. This is indeed the main reason why BR use annual frequency data. In contrast, changes in VAT rate are arguably internalized promptly by households, since consumption is performed on a more continuos and frequent manner.
Data
In this paper, we study the macroeconomic e¤ects of tax policy in 14 industrial countries for the period 1980-2009. 11 Given the absence of a readily-available series of average marginal individual and/or corporate income tax rates for this group of countries, we focus our e¤orts on building a new quarterly value-added tax (VAT) rate series. For comparison purposes, we also construct the corresponding VAT cyclically-adjusted revenue measure at a quarterly frequency. 12 Naturally, since changes in VAT rates could be reinforced or compensated by changes in other …scal variables, we also control for changes in public expenditure as well as those in individual or corporate tax rates. For the latter, we use top marginal tax rates.
Our analysis also includes macroeconomic variables such as output, consumption, investment, exports, and imports; all of them at a quarterly frequency. 
The e¤ects of …scal consolidation tax rate changes on output
In this section, we study the e¤ect of …scal consolidation VAT rate changes on economic activity using quarterly data. We start by estimating this relationship in three progressively more elaborate ways. We …nd that VAT rate (hereafter tax rate) increases have strong negative e¤ects on output. In section 4.1, we analyze how various components of GDP, such as consumption and investment respond to tax rate changes. Predictably, consumption seems to be the most sensitive component. We conclude our analysis with some robustness tests, where we control for other …scal variables changes (section 4.2). Our main …ndings are strongly robust to these considerations.
We begin our analysis by estimating the e¤ect of tax rate changes on economic activity using the following basic speci…cation:
where y is the real GDP growth rate, t represents …scal consolidation tax rate change, and d is country dummy. In estimating equation (4), we include four lags (i.e., J = 4). 15 This 1 4 One possible source of low correlation may be di¤erences in timing. Suppose, for example, that revenues are turned over to the government with a 1-quarter lag. Then there might be low correlation between the change in cyclically-adjusted revenues and the change in the tax rate, but a high correlation between the change in cyclically-adjusted and the lagged change in the tax rate. This suspicion, however, is not warranted as the correlation between cyclically-adjusted revenues and lagged tax rates changes range (within a 1-year period) between 0.07 and 0.005. 1 5 Our …ndings remain robust to the inclusion of further lags.
approach should yield unbiased reduced-form impact estimates of tax rate changes on output (see top-left cell in Table 1 ). Considering the intrinsic nature of …scal consolidation episodes, tax rate increases bear, in principle, no relation to the current or prospective state of the economy, but rather to inherited budget de…cits. Therefore, the estimation of (4) is based on exogenous …scal shocks. Moreover, any issues in terms of measurement errors are also disregarded, since the tax variable used is a tax instrument, as opposed to a revenue-based one, such as the cyclically-adjusted revenue.
While conceptually appropriate, a key inconvenient of using changes in tax rates is that the estimated coe¢ cients do not correspond to the usual tax multiplier for GDP. The results link the change in GDP to the change in the tax rate and not in tax revenue per se. We compute the tax multiplier (i.e., the response of GDP to a unit increase in tax revenue) by exploiting the typical relationship of tax revenue to tax rate. Let R be real VAT revenue, Y real output, T "implicit"VAT rate (de…ned as R=Y ), and e the average relationship between T and t (i.e., e = T =t). Following BR (pages 80-81), the tax multiplier is then given by 16 T ax multiplier
Using a Taylor approximation of (5), it follows that the standard error of the tax multiplier equals 17 T ax multiplier SE = e (e + T ) 2 SE ;
where SE is the standard error of . Figure 3 uses estimates from (4) to illustrate the tax multiplier, de…ned as the e¤ect of a unit shock increase in VAT revenue collection on output together with the one-standard-error bands. This …gure shows that the e¤ect is consistently 1 6 What follows is the proof of this result.
. From equation (4), we know that Y =Y = t.
Therefore,
. e captures the historical relationship between T and t (i.e., e = T =t). Then, T = e t. Finally,
The proof is as follows. From (5) T ax multiplier = f (x), where f (x) = and signi…cantly negative. In particular, the impact e¤ect represents a fall in output of $1.02 (t = 2:36). The subsequent e¤ect on output is downwards for the next three quarters before slightly rebounding after a year. The maximum e¤ect is reached after three quarters, with a fall in output of $2.70 (t = 2:96).
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We now enrich speci…cation (4) by adding four lags of output growth itself:
That is to say, J = 4 and N = 4. As discussed in RR, including this key control variable could help in several ways. In particular, it helps control for the normal dynamics of output while, simultaneously, providing a simple way of controlling for other factors a¤ecting output, most likely serially correlated. Using the estimates from (7), Figure 4 shows the tax multiplier when controlling for lagged output growth. 18 For comparison purposes, this …gure also reports the …ndings from the speci…cation without GDP growth lags. Results are virtually unchanged both in terms of point estimates and precision as well as the temporal pro…le depicted.
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Last, but certainly not least, we present the results of a two-variable SVAR. As in (4) and (4) we use four lags. Figure 5 displays the tax multiplier when using the two-variable SVAR.
The temporal pro…le of the tax multiplier is similar to the one obtained using speci…cation (7).
However, the estimated maximum e¤ect falls from $2.70 (t = 2:96) to $2.76 (t = 2:13). Figure 6 presents the following impulse response functions. Panel A shows the response of the tax series to a one percent tax shock. The dynamic is very short lived; it basically 1 8 The estimated impact of tax rate changes is now a dynamic multiplier accounting for the implied changes in the path of lagged GDP growth. The coe¢ cient standard errors of regression (7) are calculated by taking 10,000 draws of the coe¢ cient vector from a multivariate normal distribution with mean and variance-covariance matrix equal to the point estimates and variance-covariance matrix of the regression coe¢ cients.
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vanishes after the innovation. Panels B and C display output and the tax series response to a one percent GDP shock. Panel B shows that output shocks are, as expected, serially correlated. In sharp contrast, the tax series virtually does not respond to an output shock (Panel C). After a one percent innovation on output, tax rates barely ‡uctuate between 0.003 (t = 0:61) and -0.005 (t = 0:99). The e¤ect is highly statistically insigni…cant at all time horizons. The p-value for the test of the null hypothesis that output does not granger-cause the tax series is 0.81. This …nding strongly supports our conjecture that tax rate changes identi…ed using …scal consolidation episodes (i.e., through historical narratives) are, indeed, unrelated to past output ‡uctuations.
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In sum, evidence drawn from VAT rate changes associated with …scal consolidation episodes strongly support the idea that tax rate increases have large negative e¤ects on economic activity. Indeed, a $1 increase in revenue collection reduces output by $1.02 on impact. The subsequent e¤ect on output is downwards for the next three quarters before rebounding slightly after a year. The maximum e¤ect implies a fall in output of around $2.70.
Components of output and the transmission mechanism
This section analyzes the extent to which an increase in …scal consolidation VAT rate actually reduces GDP components. In principle, VAT rate changes would most clearly a¤ect the consumption-saving margin. Because exports are generally zero-rated (and VAT refunded or o¤set against other taxes), it is sometimes argued that changes in the VAT rate could also alter the domestic-export margin. Rising VAT rates could increase …rms'incentives to export while reducing their supply to the domestic market. Additionally, increases in VAT rates may also deter imports. Indeed, this kind of rationale is at the core of some organizations' missions, such as the American Manufacturing Trade Action Coalition (AMTAC). They support a revision of United States tax law to eliminate the disadvantage to domestic manufacturers caused by foreign border-adjusted taxes such as the value-added tax. 
IN SERT F IGU RE 7 HERE

Controlling for other …scal variables changes
Like RR, we now control for changes in other …scal variables. First, we analyze government spending and, later, we focus on some other taxes. Government expenditure can have a large impact on output. If during episodes of …scal consolidation, government spending typically decreased at the same time that tax rate increases, omitting the former would bias the tax multiplier downwards, giving the false idea that tax rate hikes are more contractionary than they actually are. On the other hand, if during episodes of …scal consolidation government spending typically increased to compensate to a certain extent for the alleged negative e¤ect of tax rate increases, omitting the former would bias the tax multiplier towards zero, giving the false impression that tax rate hikes are not that contractionary. The data do not seem to support any systematic contemporaneous relation (at a quarterly frequency) between changes in government expenditure and tax rates during episodes of …scal consolidation. 19 Naturally, changes in government expenditure and tax rates could also be non perfectly syncronized and still a¤ect the tax multiplier. Indeed, we cannot reject at the 10 percent level of signi…cance that government expenditure decreases after a quarter of a …scal consolidation tax rate change. Figure 8 shows the results. 20 Panel A shows that the tax multiplier remains unchanged after controlling for government expenditure. Panel B also con…rms -as Figure 6 panel Cthat tax rates barely ‡uctuate after a one percent innovation on output. In Figure 8 , panel C displays the government expenditure multiplier, only with spending changes occurring during periods of …scal consolidation. The size of the spending multiplier is in line with some previous 1 9 Such correlation is -0.02, preventing the rejection of the null hypothesis about independence at a 68 percent level of con…dence.
2 0 For comparison purposes, we assumed as it is common practice in the literature that gt = 0 and tg = 0 in the matrix of contemporaneous relations between endogenous variables. Our results are almost identical if we used estimates of gt and tg using a LSDV model. These …gures are not reported for brevity. studies. A one unit shock to government expenditure increases output by $0.68 (t = 3:40)
on impact and by $1.15 (t = 1:99) after a year. However, focusing on spending changes occurring during …scal consolidations episodes does not fully insulate government spending from responding to GDP shocks (potential endogeneity problems). Unlike the case of tax rate changes, where it is fairly straightforward, if time consuming, to assess the nature of a legislated tax change, we cannot gauge the nature of total government spending ‡uctuations.
Indeed, as discussed in section 1, this is the main reason why a signi…cant part of the literature has focused on spending categories, such as military buildups, since these are the least likely to respond to output ‡uctuations. Figure 8 , panel D supports this presumption. A one percent increase in GDP triggers an increase in government expenditure, especially after three quarters. The p-value for the test of the null hypothesis that output does not granger-cause the spending series is 0.01. 21 
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We now control for changes in other taxes; namely corporate and individual income tax rates. Given the absence of a readily available dataset on average marginal income tax rate for the 14 countries used in this study, we use top marginal corporate and individual income tax rates. Figure 9 shows the VAT multiplier with and without these additional tax rates. 22 The impact e¤ect weakens from $1.02 (t = 2:36) to $0.89 (t = 1:59). The estimated maximum e¤ect falls from $2.76 (t = 2:13) to $4.09 (t = 1:76). Broadly speaking, results are robust and VAT tax increases reduce output.
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2 1 If we included all government expenditure changes instead of only those associated to …scal consolidation episodes, the tax multiplier would remain virtually unchanged. On the other hand, the government multiplier would decrease because of the apparent short-run countercyclical response of spending to output ‡uctuations. These …gures are not reported for the sake of brevity. 2 2 We assumed that the contemporaneous relations between the di¤erent tax rate changes in the matrix of endogenous variables are zero. Our results are almost identical if we used estimates using a LSDV model. These …gures are not reported for brevity.
Comparison with alternative empirical strategies
This section examines the implications of using alternative empirical strategies for exogenous …scal shocks identi…cation and tax policy measurement. For comparison purposes, …gures also report …ndings from the speci…cation on …scal consolidation tax rate changes ( Figure 5 and We …rst analyze the implications of using the VAT rate, a proper tax instrument, and the Blanchard-Perotti identi…cation strategy (bottom-left cell in Table 1 ). In other words, we use all tax rate changes -not only those associated with …scal consolidation episodes -and allow for the structural assumption proposed by Blanchard and Perotti (2002) to identify …scal shocks. 23 One could also think that the di¤erence in tax multipliers shown in Figure 10 , panel A, may re ‡ect that the impact of tax rate changes are asymmetric depending on whether they are tax cuts or tax hikes. Since all our …scal consolidation tax rate changes are positive (i.e., increases in tax rates), we also provide evidence when using all positive tax rate changes and allowing for the structural assumption proposed by Blanchard and Perotti (2002) to identify …scal shocks. 24 We now focus on a revenue-based measure, aiming at assessing policymaker's discretionary changes (i.e., the VAT cyclically-adjusted revenue), as well as …scal consolidation episodes to identify exogenous …scal shocks (top-right cell in Table 1 ). In other words, we adopt a commonly-used proxy for the tax policy instrument as well as a "natural experiment"approach in order to identify changes in …scal policy not driven by output ‡uctuations. Figure 10 , panels E and F, displays those results. 25 Panel E shows that the general pro…le of this multiplier is completely di¤erent from that obtained with tax rates. In particular, the tax multiplier seems to be neutral with respect to GDP, as in Perotti (2004) Lastly, we focus on VAT cyclically-adjusted revenues and the Blanchard-Perotti identi…cation strategy (bottom-right cell in Table 1 ). As discussed in Section 1, this strategy is by far the most commonly used in the literature. Figure 10 , panels G and H, displays our results. Panel G proves that this multiplier is not only non-contractionary, but, in fact, fairly expansionary! A unit shock increase in VAT revenue collection increases output by $0.18 (t = 2:19) on impact, and about $0.78 (t = 3:40) after three quarters. Panel H shows that 2 5 Considering (3) we show that when using cyclically-adjusted revenues, T ax multiplier Therefore,
. Using a Taylor …rst order approximation, we obtain T ax multiplier = f ( )+f 0 ( ) (x ) = f ( )+f 0 ( ) x f 0 ( ) . Applying the variance to both sides of the equation, we obtain V ar(T ax multiplier)
Evaluating f (x) at x = , then, V ar(T ax multiplier) [f 0 ( )] 2 V ar ( ). Applying square roots to both sides of the equation, it follows that T ax multiplierSE
cyclically-adjusted revenue changes tend to respond positively to output changes in the shortterm while negatively after three quarters. We cannot reject the hypothesis that the …rst and fourth lags are positive (p-value = 0.93) and negative (p-value = 0.98), respectively. These …ndings support our concerns regarding the validity of econometric structural assumptions as a way to identify …scal shocks.
To sum up, these …ndings support our concerns on both the use of cyclically-adjusted revenue measures to asses changes in tax policy instruments as well as the exclusive use of econometric structural assumptions to identify exogenous …scal shocks. On the identi…cation front, our empirical evidence favors the use of "natural experiments" as a more legitimate manner of assessing …scal policy changes not resulting from policymakers' response to output ‡uctuations. Our results also support Perotti (2011) , who shows that once narrative information from RR is incorporated into SVAR estimations, tax multipliers are more contractionary than standard SVAR estimates. In our sample, …scal consolidation episodes are associated, both for tax rates and cyclically-adjusted series, with more contractionary tax multipliers. Compare Panels A and C for tax rates in Figure 10 , and Panels E and G for cyclically-adjusted revenues.
In terms of the (much less explored) issue of measurement of the tax policy instrument, we conclude that there is really no good substitute for data on tax rates themselves. Our main point -the importance of using tax rates to measure tax policy instrument -is, however, independent of the particular identi…cation strategy: it applies equally to the analysis of …scal shocks identi…ed through the narratives à la RR as well as when using SVAR. Tax 
Evidence from Romer-Romer and Barro-Redlick data
Using BR and RR income tax data for the United States, this section provides complementary evidence regarding the importance of appropriately measuring the tax policy instrument. BR use average annual marginal income tax rates from individual United States federal and state income taxes as well as those from social security payroll. On the other hand, as discussed later, BR use a revenue-based measure which in fact su¤ers from forward-looking endogeneity.
Barro-Redlick tax rate
We …rst use the BR measure of United States average annual marginal income tax rates from individual federal and state income taxes as well as social security payroll taxes (AMITR). Figure 11 shows the change in this tax measure. We categorize these changes depending on whether they occurred during episodes of …scal consolidation or not. Overall, we have 24 changes in AMITR; 15 being tax rate increases and 9 tax rate decreases. Excluding zeros, the median tax rate change is 0.1 percent. The highest tax rate reduction is -2.3 percent in 1987, whereas the maximum tax rate increase is 2 percent in 1981. All …scal consolidation tax rate changes (i.e., tax rate changes that occurred during periods of …scal consolidations) are positive; adding up to a total of 9. The median …scal consolidation tax rate change is 0.7 percent. About 60 percent of tax rate increases (9 out of 15) are associated with episodes of …scal consolidations. Most of these …scal consolidation tax rate changes occurred during the early 80s and mid 90s.
In Figure 12 , Panel A shows the cumulative response of GDP to a …scal consolidation BR tax rate shock. 26 While the e¤ect on impact is slightly positive, in the medium and long term, the e¤ect of an individual income tax rate increase is to reduce output. BR also …nd a sizable negative e¤ect of tax rate increases on economic activity. As opposed to the immediate contractionary reaction observed for increases in VAT rates ( Figure 5 ), this output delayed contractionary response to increases in individual income tax rates is consistent with our conjecture of agents asymmetrically learning and responding to di¤erent tax type changes.
As suggested by BR, information regarding changes in tax rates, tax brackets, and deductions in the AMITR are gradually learned by households throughout the year. Therefore, it is no surprise that output reaction is initially muted, becoming stronger over time as agents learn about it. On the other hand, changes in VAT rates are, arguably, promptly internalized by households, since consumption is an activity performed on a more continuos and frequent manner. 2 6 For comparability, we include -as in RR -12 lags in the SVAR estimations. Figure 12 , Panel B, shows that the e¤ect of output changes on income tax rates is insigni…cant. The null hypothesis test p-value that output does not granger-cause the tax series is 0.36. As in Sections 4 and 5, this …nding strongly supports our conjecture that tax rate changes identi…ed using …scal consolidation episodes are, indeed, unrelated to past output ‡uctuations.
Cyclically-adjusted revenues
We now focus our attention on changes in the cyclically-adjusted revenue measure. 27 Figure   13 displays both the BR tax rate and cyclically-adjusted revenue changes. The latter proves to be a poor approximation to changes in tax policy (i.e., tax rates). As in the case of the VAT, changes in cyclically-adjusted revenues tend to strongly over-count discretionary shifts in tax policy (by a factor of about 3.5). While the data comprises 24 changes in the individual income tax rates, the cyclically-adjusted revenue measure identi…es more than a hundred. Thus, the correlation between changes in cyclically-adjusted revenues and tax rate is rather low, namely 0.08. Even when focusing on observations where tax rate changes are not zero, the correlation between changes in cyclically-adjusted revenues and tax rate is rather low, 0.17. Moreover, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of independence at a 40 percent level of con…dence. If we further restrict our comparison to …scal consolidation episodes, such correlation is 0.1, and we cannot reject the null hypothesis of independence at a 65 percent level of con…dence.
In line with our …ndings for the VAT (Figure 10 , Panel C), the output response to a cyclically-adjusted revenue shock is strongly biased towards zero ( Figure 12 , Panel C). This neutrality result contradicts the one obtained using BR tax rates. Also in line with our previous …ndings, the null hypothesis test p-value that output does not granger-cause the tax series is 0.89 ( Figure 12 , Panel D).
Romer-Romer tax measure
Last, we turn to the measure used by RR. As opposed to the actual change in revenues occurred after the implementation of a tax change, they measure tax policy using the planned change in tax receipts, assessed during the prior legislative process. One would think, then, that this measure could avoid the contemporaneous feedback from GDP (BR, 2011). However, those planned changes in tax receipts are based on forecasts, including the impact of the proposed legislative change on economic activity. 28 The di¤erence between their measure of planned change in tax receipts and the ex-post one lies in the measurement errors in income forecasts (Perotti, 2011) . In other words, their measure of tax policy is also revenuebased, but on predicted rather than current revenues. It thus su¤ers from forward-lookingreverse causality from future economic activity. One must bear in mind that RR …nd that de…cit-driven tax increases have a weak positive e¤ect on GDP. While they caution about the estimates' precision, they suggest that this di¤erence might re ‡ect that increasing taxes for …scal consolidation purposes may be less costly than other tax increases. can reject the null hypothesis of independence between RR and cyclically-adjusted revenues at the one percent level of con…dence (see Figure 15 ). In contrast, we cannot reject the null hypothesis about independence between the BR tax rate and cyclically-adjusted revenue changes.
Indeed, using RR, we also …nd that …scal consolidation tax changes do not have an e¤ect on economic activity ( Figure 12 , Panel E). 29 This neutrality result contradicts that obtained using BR tax rates, yet is more similar to the one using cyclically-adjusted revenues ( Figure   12 , Panel E).
To sum up, the evidence resulting from tax rates and revenue-based measures for the United States also supports our claim about the importance of using a tax policy instrument under the direct control of the policymaker, as opposed to a revenue-based performance inherently contaminated by tax base ‡uctuations and measurement errors. In line with our VAT …ndings, we observe that tax rates increases are contractionary. Our evidence suggests that RR's weak positive/neutral e¤ect of …scal consolidation tax increases does not seem to support their claim that tax increases for …scal consolidation purposes may be less costly than others. This seems to be the result of not appropriately measuring the tax policy instrument.
Alternatively, using BR tax rates, we …nd that …scal consolidation tax rate increases reduce output.
Conclusions
Our paper contributes to the empirical literature on tax multipliers. On the one hand, we revisit the discussion regarding the identi…cation of exogenous …scal policy shocks (i.e., …scal policy changes that are not the result of policymakers responding to output ‡uctuations). Our …ndings support RR's in that the narrative approach seems to be a more convincing strategy than SVAR to truly identify exogenous …scal shocks. We also show that once narrative information is incorporated into SVAR estimations, tax multipliers are more contractionary than standard SVAR estimates (Perotti, 2011) .
On the other hand, we explore the less discussed implications about the measurement of the tax policy (i.e., changes in tax policy variable under the direct control of the policymaker).
For this purpose, we built a novel value-added tax rate dataset and the associated cyclicallyadjusted revenue measure at the quarterly frequency for 14 industrial countries for the period 1980-2009. We also complement our analysis using BR and RR income tax data for the United States. Our results strongly support the use of tax rates as a true measure of tax policy instrument as opposed to widely-used revenue-based measures, such as cyclically-adjusted revenues. The latter tend to severely over-count alleged discretionary changes in tax policy and is a poor proxy for changes in tax rates. Our main point -the importance of using tax rates to measure tax policy instrument -is, however, independent of the particular identi…cation strategy: it applies identically to the analysis of …scal shocks identi…ed through the narratives à la RR as well as when using SVAR. Tax rate increases are always contractionary. However, tax multipliers based on cyclically-adjusted revenues are, at worst, neutral or even expansionary!
Personal income tax rate
Maximum marginal personal income tax rate.
Corporate income tax rate
Maximum corporate income tax rate.
VAT rate
Standard VAT rate.
VAT revenue
VAT Revenue.
8.6 Cyclically-adjusted VAT revenue measure
As described by equation (3), cyclically-adjusted revenue change is calculated as follows:
cyclically-adjusted t = r t r t 1 (y t y t 1 ) ;
where r is the log of VAT tax revenues, y the log of output, and the historical average tax revenue elasticity of output. We use values of for indirect taxation calculated by Paul van den Noord (2000). 30 The average elasticity for the countries included in the sample is 0.9. What follows is the elasticity estimated by these authors for each country: Australia (0. 
Episodes of …scal consolidation
Episodes of …scal consolidation are taken from "Will it hurt? Macroeconomic e¤ects of …scal consolidation," World Economic Outlook, IMF, 2010. We use their action-based approach episodes. They calculated these episodes for the period 1980-2009. 31 "Natural experiment" (à la Romer and Romer, 2010) • No endogeneity.
• No measurement error.
• No endogeneity.
• Possible measurement error, especially due to changes in non-policy factors.
(Fiscal policy changes that are not the result of policymakers responding to output fluctuations)
Structural VAR (à la Blanchard and Perotti, 2002) • Endogeneity problems if tax changes are forwardlooking/anticipated.
• Endogeneity problems if tax changes are forwardlooking/anticipated.
• Possible measurement error, especially due changes in to non-policy factors.
Tax rate Cyclically-adjusted revenue
Measurement of tax policy
(Finding a tax policy variable under the direct control of the policymaker)
